The end of the Cold War brought about the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a superpower. It also resulted in the need to rebuild the theories of international relations. The fundamental problems of the world did not change when the Berlin Wall fell or when Lech Walesa was elected President of Poland. There is still conflict, there are still people who want what they do not have, and there are still issues that defy a unilateral solution.
Similarly, the behavior of states and other actors can still be explained by theories that were developed before or during the Cold War. Structuralism, which posits a core of great powers and a periphery of dependent, lesser powers, was put to extensive use by Cold War theorists. Although much of what was built up around the foundation of Structuralism applied to a bipolar world, the foundation is sound and upon it can be constructed a model which applies today.
The fundamental kernel of Structuralism can be used to explain much of what occurred during the Cold War, especially if some additional clarifying assumptions are postulated. First, Structuralism needs to be defined. Although what follows may not be the description Wallerstein would have used in the 1960's, it will serve as a working definition. The world can be divided into a core and a periphery. At the core are the 'great powers' and in the periphery are the third world countries. Those actors that are peripheral powers aspire to become central powers and those actors that are already in the core wish to remain there and maintain the status quo.
Dependency theory extended this fairly simple model to account for why marginal powers remained so and did not migrate to the core. It said that that within the periphery there are substructures with a core and periphery. Thus, within Latin America there are regional powers like Argentina or Brazil that are the focus of even weaker peripheral countries. These regional powers believe it is in their best interest to maintain the dependency structure because they benefit from it. Furthermore, within individual countries, there are actors (perhaps exporters or plantation owners) who benefit from that countries status on the periphery and are at the core of their counties power structure so are able and willing to maintain the status quo.
Although dependency theory extends Structuralism and adequately explains international relations during the Cold War, the basic principles do not satisfactorily account for the end of the Cold War and the current global situation. According to Structuralism as explained above, the United States and other Western powers had a vested interest in maintaining their central position, which they shared with the Soviet Union and perhaps China. (This "perhaps" is key, because it alludes to the vagueness about what constitutes a central power.) They would not want to diminish the power associated with being at the core and would not want to increase the potential for peripheral states to obtain core status. But if this were the case, if there was one core that sought to preserve itself, then the Western powers would have been more vociferous in opposing the breakup of the Soviet Union -- after all, one would think that the dismantling of one central power definitely diminished the respect accorded to the others.
The inappropriateness of a single-structure world is also demonstrated by recent events involving France. This summer France announced that it would conduct several tests of its atomic weapons in the Pacific. Countries around the world reacted vigorously, condemning the tests and calling for their cancellation (which was not forthcoming). One of the arguments that was put forth by opponents of the tests was that by detonating nuclear weapons, France was encouraging non-nuclear states to pursue nuclear weapons programs more assiduously. France's influence is not limited to nuclear issues. It is a generous contributor of soldiers to United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, and conducts its own operations in Africa. Militarily, France is very much a central power. Contrast this with current labor issues affecting France. The general strike that crippled Paris and most of France for weeks was widely covered in the press, but was not considered to have much of an effect on international markets and economics. Although it may affect the Maastricht Treaty implementation, it does not appear to have worried international leaders enough for anyone to officially comment on it. This implies that economically, France is no longer central (especially when compared to Europe as a whole, Russia, Germany, China, the United States, and Japan).
What I propose is the existence of two types of structures, an economic one and a military one. Each retains the characteristics of the classical structure (i.e., a central core with a surrounding periphery which itself contains a core and periphery, cascading down to individuals) but is more specialized. While I do not presume to set down strict classifications schemes, I will put forth some general guidelines.
A state or other actor is a central military power if it can exert a global influence by means of its armed forces and if other actors recognize that it can do so (thereby reducing the need of the country to actually use military might and allowing it to affect international relations by the mere threat, explicit or implied, of armed force). The United States and NATO are probably the only two central military powers, although countries such as France, Russia, and China are definitely regional powers. Any country with a nuclear weapons and a mechanism for their delivery may also have to be considered central, or at least foremost among peripheral countries. In addition, states with ties to terrorist organizations and terrorist organizations themselves can be fairly powerful militarily. Such actors may not be able to wage a conventional war successfully, but their interests must be taken into account and their reach is potentially global.
A central economic power is similar to a central military power in that the mere hint of a change in economic policy can have dramatic repercussions around the world. The United States, Japan, Germany, and the European Community spring to mind as current central economic powers. Multinational corporations such as AT&T, large banks, and cartels such as OPEC also wield a lot of influence around the world, and may be core powers in the economic structure. Non-traditional groups such as drug cartels and smuggling operations may have military power buy are primarily economic in nature. The economic power of illegal groups is difficult to ascertain, but at the height of its power, perhaps the Medallin drug cartel would have been a strong regional economic power.
The final modification that I propose is to allow for a 'sphere of influence' factor. That is somewhat of a misnomer, but I am alluding to the fact that the behavior of two central powers do not have equal effects on a third country. Poland, for example, was affected much more by the Soviet Union's military power than by NATO's. In the present day, the economic affairs of Mexico are more attuned to those of the United States than those of Japan, and the military behavior of China has more influence in the internal politics of Taiwan that that of NATO. There are various reasons for the degree of influence one actor has over another, but regardless of those reasons, Structuralism should be modified to account for it.
Taking the dual structure and variable influence into account, Structuralism might result in a Cold War era diagram that looked like Figure 1.
Figure 1: A Hypothetical Cold War Structure Diagram
In Figure 1, the United States and the Soviet Union are both economic and military central powers. England is extremely close to the United States because it is heavily influenced by the US. Note that England is also somewhat within the military core, reflecting the fact the England is still a global nuclear power. Japan is almost entirely a core economic power (it was not quite there during the cold war) and as such is only slightly close to the US than the USSR. Militarily, Japan is on the periphery and although greatly influenced by the presence of US troops, still affected by proximity to the Soviet Union and therefore almost equidistant from the two.
This modified structure facilitates explaining both the end of the Cold War and the current state of international affairs. International affairs can be seen as a combinations of struggles. Actors struggle to become core powers (either within local, regional, or global structures) and central powers struggle to ensure that peripheral powers remain peripheral. At the same time, central powers are trying to increase the influence they wield in the periphery and decrease that of other central powers.
The Soviet Union, either through inept management of inherent flaws in its system, lost its central status as an economic power. This greatly disrupted the alignment of peripheral powers, who shifted from orbiting the Soviet pole to orbiting the United States pole. Despite a gradual loss of economic power, the shift in the periphery was dramatic and virtually instantaneous. Although the overall result could be predicted by looking at the diminishing power of the Soviet Union in the context of this Structural model, the ultimate decisions are made my individuals whose behavior is difficult to foresee. In any case, the loss of its satellites on the periphery resulted in internal instabilities that culminated in the ascendancy of Yeltsin and the breakup of the Union. Those actors that had been in the Soviet sphere did one of two things. They either drifted closer to another central power (Poland and Vietnam did this) or they remained where they were, by default affected more by the remaining powers than there had previously been , but for the most part acting independently (like Iraq or Cuba).
Note that the military decline of the Soviet Union was not a primary cause of its fall. Rather, its loss of military potency was caused by its economic failures, and even now the military power of Russia is great. Many countries, especially those that were Soviet Republics, are definitely influenced by the military power of Russia. However, they are also in the economic orbit of the United States, Japan, or Europe and are thus not totally bound to Russia.
The regional conflicts of today are fairly easily explained by this Structural model. In Europe and Asia, the power vacuum left by the fall of the Soviet Union has left many countries vying for regional power status. There is very little fighting between nations, and what does occur is one power seeking to assert its central status. When any of these conflicts have the potential to result in an unusually powerful regional actor, the core powers intervene because they do not want to be joined in the core by another actor.
Structuralism also applies to international conflicts. The local periphery may en masse decide that they would be best served by a change in government. Checnyans decided they desired more independence from Moscow. Moscow disagreed initially, and fighting ensued. Moscow has now recognized that a new government is indeed needed, but is still trying to retain power in Chechnya by placing Moscophiles in the government. This is an ongoing conflict between a regional core and a peripheral actor.
NAFTA is a another nice example of this system in action. The power of Japan and a unified Europe threatened to diminish the economic influence of the United States. By signing NAFTA, the US enhances its power and influence. It is true that is also enhances the economic power of Canada and Mexico, but those countries are very firmly in the US sphere of influence and are not seen as a threat economically or militarily. The tight linkage between Mexico and the US is best exhibited by the recent Peso crisis.
The most dramatic change I have suggested is recognizing that there are two structures -- an economic and a military one. If one wants to classify a superpower as an actor that is in the global core of both structures, than the United States is the only remaining superpower (although China and a somewhat united Europe may soon claim such status). After adding a way to model spheres of influence and the dual structures, Structuralism can explain the Cold War, its end, and the current state of international affairs. This simple but powerful paradigm can be used to answer questions ranging from what conflicts global powers will intervene in to how they work together to limit the power of drug cartels and terrorists.