Nationalism may be compatible with liberalism but the recent rise in a particularly virulent strand of nationalism creates a serious dilemma for the current international state system. How far does the sovereign power of the state extend when it is opposed to the self-determining power of a population? In the former Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, and Iraqi Kurdistan the United States and the world are faced with this question. Inherent in the international system since the Treaty of Westphalia and reaffirmed in the Helsinki accords is the precept of state sovereignty. Yet embodied in the Wilsonian principles that have been a cornerstone of United States participation in that same international system is the precept that a people has a right to self-determination. A crisis results when members of an existing state decide that the time has come for them to exercise that self-determination in defiance of the will of an elected government.
This paper will examine the situations in the former Yugoslavia (focusing on Bosnia-Herzegovina), the Russian Federation (particularly Chechnya), and Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to establish the conflict between the two principles more clearly. The behavior of the United States will be looked at and I will present my solution to the conflict.
Two disclaimers are in order. The preponderance of information available concerned Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia so most of the details in this paper relate to that crisis. Also, although the entire international system will have to deal with the interaction between sovereignty and self-determination, due to time and space constraints this paper focuses on how the United States should and does react to that interaction. References to other states and international organizations occur when they are relevant or to provide additional examples.
Recent literature on this topic seems to be fairly scarce. Several pieces listed at the conclusion of this paper address the issue of state sovereignty versus nationalistic self-determination peripherally, and a very few have it as a primary topic. In most cases it is assessed from a theoretical point of view with out exploring real world ramifications. Those works that deal with what is occurring in the world today usually do not bring the theoretical concepts to the fore. In this paper I hope to synthesize the two approaches and shed some light on what the United States can and should do to resolve what looms as one of the most pressing theoretical issues in international relation today.
In the past ten years the conflict between state sovereignty and a powerful nationalism has degenerated into armed conflict between the central government and breakaway rebels fairly often. An examination of three of those cases can provide a bit of insight into the nature of the conflict and how the United States and world respond to it.
Warren Zimmerman was the last ambassador of the United States to Yugoslavia. Unless otherwise specified, his accounts of what transpired in the final moments of that country are the basis of the following paragraphs.
Upon being appointed ambassador in 1989, Zimmerman agreed with Bush Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on a message to send to the Belgrade government. The United States would support the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Yugoslavia, but only in the "context of democracy"-- not if it were imposed or preserved by force. Slovenia, the only Serbless republic in Federal Yugoslavia, challenged that unity. The Federation, under Serbian Slobodan Milosevic, imposed trade sanctions against Slovenia and Croatia, which was also speaking of secession. Milosevic soon switched his position from one favoring the retention of Yugoslavia to one favoring the creation of a Greater Serbia. Most of the ambassadors from the various republics that constituted Yugoslavia favored altering the structure of the state so that it allowed for a looser union -- thereby preserving the state but satisfying the demands for more regional autonomy.
The first post-Communist elections took place in January of 1990 and were a disaster for the unionists. Although the Prime Minister, Croat Ante Markovic, favored Federation-wide elections, none were held and nationalists were voted into power on ethnically charged platforms in all republics except Macedonia. Arch-nationalist Franjo Tudjman was voted into office in Croatia in May of 1990. As a result of their elections, the Slovenians held a referendum and declared that unless a looser confederation was formed they would secede in June of 1991. Tudjman said that Croatia would do whatever Slovenia did. In return, Milosevic threatened that the breakup of Yugoslavia would lead to the creation of a Greater Serbia. Alija Izetbegovic, a devout Muslim, a moderate, and the elected leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina, envisioned a multinational (or multiracial) Bosnia and prophetically deemed the survival of Yugoslavia essential to the survival of such a Bosnia. The plans of the nationalistic leaders would by default create a Muslim entity free of Serbs and Croats in a region that had the highest percentage of ethnically mixed marriages of any of the republics.
Yugoslavia, before the breakup, possessed the fifth largest army in Europe and it was well armed by both the Soviets and a domestic arms industry. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was led by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Serb General Veljko Kadijevic. In early 1991 the JNA attempted to force the Yugoslavian presidency (which was a weak, eight person chief of state) to declare martial law because Croatia and Slovenia were encouraging their nationals to desert and enlist in Territorial Defense Forces (comparable to the United States' National Guard). When the group refused to do so, Milosevic used his four votes on the council to ensure the next President was not the regularly scheduled Croat but was instead a Serb.
On June 21, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with most of the key figures in the stewing crisis. He expressed the desire of the United States to see Yugoslavia band together behind Markovic, who was at that point little more than a figurehead. In addition, he extended the support of the United States to any arrangement on which the Yugoslav people peacefully agreed, said that the country would not support any unilateral secession, and asked that if such activity did take place, it be by negotiated agreement and not ultimatum. Finally, he made clear that unity by gun point was not acceptable, stated that the United States would oppose any use of force or threat to block democratic change, and hammered Milosevic for human rights violations (in Kosovo) and pressed him to stop toying with the presidency.
In late June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Controlling the borders with Austria and Italy, Slovenia appropriated the rights to goods destined for other republics and a customs revenue which accounted for about 75% of the federal budget. The JNA entered Slovenia, but withdrew after ten days. The casualty figures were 37 JNA dead and 12 Slovenes dead. In Croatia, the JNA initially separated Serbian Croats from the Croatians, but then began handing land over to the Serbs.
The European Community and United Nations began cease fire efforts in the summer of 1991. Cyrus Vance and Lord Peter Carrington shared the task and on January 3, 1992, the status quo was frozen in Croatia with the Serbs holding a quarter of the republic. United Nations peacekeepers arrived in Croatia in March of 1992.
The United States, Vance, and Carrington all believed that there should be no Western recognition of any republic until they had all agreed on a mutual relationship. In the fall of 1991 the JNA had begun shelling civilians in Croatia. While no Western government called on NATO to stop the shelling, the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gensher pressed the European Community to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and offer recognition to Bosnia and Macedonia. This was done on December 17, 1991 over the objections of Vance and Carrington. Once recognition was offered, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, intensified his plans for independence from a multiethnic Bosnian government. In March of 1992 he attempted a putsch in Sarajevo and declared a Serbian Republic -- before Bosnia had accepted any offers of recognition of independence. In response to this, the United States and NATO countries recognized Bosnia in April. Armed conflict between the JNA supplied (at least initially) Serbs and Bosnian government broke out en masse.
At the end of November 1995, representatives of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia signed a peace treaty establishing a confederated Bosnia. The country consists of distinct Serbian and Muslim-Croatian regions, with the capital of Sarajevo remaining entirely within the domain of Muslim and Croatian Bosnians. Whether or not the agreement will stand remains to be seen.
The Kurds are an ethnically distinguishable people with their own language and culture. About twenty million Kurds live in a contiguous block of land that is divided among five countries -- Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Armenia. Ever since Kemal Ataturk rejected the Treaty of Sevrez and its establishment of an independent Kurdistan in 1920, the Kurds in each country have acted fairly independently of each other. The Iraqi Kurds compose about one fifth of the Iraqi population and are the only ones that pose a real threat to their country's central government. Unlike its neighbors, Iraq has been compelled since the days of the League of Nations to provide some form of Kurdish autonomy.
Iraqi Kurds have a long history of attempted revolution and have long desired autonomy. In 1970 an agreement with the Ba'ath party was worked out which would have set up an autonomous Kurdistan and made the Kurdish language co-equal with Arabic in that region. The agreement was never carried out and in the Spring of 1974 the Iraqi army pushed the Pesh Merga, the Kurdish fighting force, back into far northern Iraq. By setting up controllable Kurdish regions and transplanting Kurd and Arab populations, the Ba'ath party hoped to Arabify northern Iraq. The Iran-Iraq war distracted the Iraqi army from this goal, but after the war was concluded they redoubled their efforts. Iraq went so far as to use poison gas against the Kurds -- Iraqi citizens -- in 1988.
The Kurds fought back and by March of 1991 controlled almost all of traditional Iraqi Kurdistan. This revolution was also crushed by Iraq and some cities remained in Iraqi hands after their advance was stopped by the Kurds. In Mid-April, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands created a safe haven. The Kurds controlled most of their land again by the end of September. Although conflict continues, the imposition of a no-fly zone and Operation Desert Storm have severely limited the ability of the Iraqis to eliminate what is now an autonomous region within Iraq.
The United States armed forces have been present in Kurdistan to take part on Operation Provide Comfort. Acting under then Lt. General John Shalikashvili, they worked with participants from other countries and from international relief organizations to provide humanitarian aid to the Kurds. An Iraqi counterpart to Shalikashvili was appointed by Hussein and the two generals met to ensure that Iraq would not interfere with the humanitarian operation. In fact, Iraqis were to be 30KM from where the aid workers were active in northern Iraq.
The Chechnians inhabit the mountainous Caucasus, a region that rivals the Balkans in its history of ethnic strife and diversity. "Today, some 50 ethnic groups are concentrated in the Northern Caucasus. For example, Chechnya's neighbor, Dagestan, with a population of 1.8 million in an area the size of Scotland, boasts 36 nationalities, all speaking different languages. The people of mountainous region are tough, independent, proud and fiercely loyal to their clans, families and traditions."
In October 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev, the elected leader of Chechnya, a republic in the Russian Federation, declared independence and began dismantling and attacking government offices. Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in 1991 and sent troops to Grozny. Parliament overruled his decision, the troops were blocked at the airport, and Yeltsin pulled them out after three days. Chechnya and Ingushetia, which had been one republic, split in June of 1992, with Ingushetia remaining in the Russian Federation.
Russia blamed Dudayev for a series of kidnappings in southern Russia in the summer of 1994 and called for Chechens to oust him. In November 1994, the Kremlin sent 44,000 soldiers to the borders of Chechnya, ostensibly to preserve order. On December 11, the forces entered Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and the fighting began in earnest. Five days later, a Russian general refuses to advance because he considers Yeltsin's actions unconstitutional. Fighting continued throughout 1995 despite an accord signed in July and official complaints from the United States, Germany, and other NATO countries. As recently as November 18, Dudayev threatened retaliation against anyone participating in presidential elections the self-proclaimed Chechen Supreme Soviet plans to hold on December 17.
What Has the Policy of the United States Been?
Many issues come into play when the United States attempts to develop a policy for behavior when conflict between nationalism and sovereignty develops. That policy has been expressed several different ways.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke has declared that it is the duty of Western Europe and America to "ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved" and that effort should be put forth to incorporate the emerging democracies into Western institutions.
This principle help explains why the United States did not call for the ouster of Yeltsin or seriously contemplate intervening in the Chechin affair. The fighting in Grozny, Chechnya did not further the reform movement in Russia and was in fact detrimental to it. The fighting casts a shadow on Russia's image as a stable, democratic, multiethnic state. But, in his 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton said that it would be wrong to react to each individual event and that instead the United States must reinforce the forces of reform. The objective of the United States is not a fragmented Russia but a stable one that respects civil and human rights.
Furthermore, intense criticism of Moscow's behavior can only weaken the executive and strengthen the tendency toward fragmentation. If the United State's national interest is the achievement and maintenance of a state system based on a balance of power but managed by great powers in the interest of peace, then an effort must be made to ensure Russia remains a multiethnic nation. The nightmares of an aggressive, nuclear Russia, a UN veto-wielding Russia, or a nuclear battlefield composed of the twenty or so component republics and 18 ethnic enclaves that constitute the Russian Federation are all equally horrible. As Congressman Doug Bereuter (R) of Nebraska testified, "If Russia falls into chaos or lurches backwards into totalitarian dictatorship, the price would be enormous." A fragmented and xenophobic Russia with 27,000 nuclear warheads might make the cold war seem desirable.
Thus the policy towards Russia's behavior in Chechnya has been one of official but muted and focused disapproval so as to express desires to Yeltsin and world while avoiding embarrassing and disrupting the government too much.
Although Galbraith calls for taking measures to topple the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and puts forth proposals to arm the Kurds while not technically violating and United Nation's resolution, the United States has not removed the dictator from power or seen to the creation of a truly independent Kurdistan. Doing so would dramatically weaken Iraq, and tilt the balance of power in the Gulf region decisively in Iran's favor. It is not at all clear that this is in the interest of the United States.
After thoroughly beating Iraq in Operation Desert Storm and coalescing a global coalition, the United States can fairly easily enforce the no-fly zone and provide for the safety of relief workers in Kurdistan. The situation is not yet resolved and Kurdish aspiration for independence are not yet fulfilled, but there is a fair amount of stability in Northern Iraq.
United States policy in Bosnia has not seem to have clearly followed any particular principle. If one is to be derived or made to fit the behavior of the United States, it is that a peaceful stability is always of paramount importance.
Initially, James Baker told Milosevic "If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose democracy." But for neither case would the use of force be condoned. Once fighting did break out, the policy of the United States became a successful one of containment, as the first preemptive United Nation Peacekeepers were placed in Macedonia.
Michael Djordjevich, a past president of the Serbian Unity Congress of America, has characterized American behavior as follows. Article III, Clause IV of the Helsinki accords guarantees the territorial integrity and unity of participating states. Yugoslavia was a signatory to that treaty. But the United States allowed Germany to encourage Croatian secession in 1991. Then officials declared that Yugoslavia was an artificial state and should be dissolved. And then the stance is that a multiethnic, mutltireligious Bosnia-Herzegovina was a viable entity so the right of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia to remain in a Yugoslavia was denied.
David Gompert of RAND explained that the United States followed several principles. Yugoslavia should become democratic. Borders, both internal and external, should be altered only by mutual consent. Force should not be used to maintain unity, and equal rights should be protected for minorities. He went on to point out that these principles applied to the mostly peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia.
At each point the United States has advocated what it deemed would peacefully and democratically preserve the existing states. Clinton has said his goal was the containment of the war and not protection of Bosnian sovereignty. At this the United States has succeeded. The preemptive imposition of peacekeepers in the South Balkans has worked well. It was clear that the region was ripe for conflict and that if fighting did break out the results could be devastating as war could spill into the Aegean and disrupt lines to the Middle East. But the peace has been maintained.
By the time the peace treaty was signed this November, the best that could be salvaged was ethnically pure Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, and a loose federation of a Serbian Bosnia and a mixed Muslim and Croatian Bosnia.
Answer To Question -- What Should The United States Policy Be?
There are several long standing principles that are the foundation for the behavior of the Western Powers. Emmanual Sieyes wrote in 1789 in What is the Third Estate "The nation exists before all, it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal, it is the law itself." The other is that conflict between a state's central authority and nationalistic elements is primarily a domestic problem
According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the central goal of the United States is "to help extend to all of Europe the benefits and obligations of the same liberal trading and collective security order that have been pillars of strength for the West." If this is still in effect, then the United States needs to take a pro-active role -- if need be, independent of the United Nations -- to preemptively work for peace and prevent armed conflict from occurring. Only then can an atmosphere be established in which multiethnic states can exist. This may sound expensive and idealistic, but ultimately more cost effective and humanitarian than oodles of nationalistic states.
In Bosnia, the United Nation's Protection Force (UNPROFOR) may "have ended up deterring, not ethnic cleansing, nor the dismemberment of an internationally recognized state, but the international community itself from undertaking more forceful action to arrest these acts." If peacekeepers are only to maintain cease fires and not actually prevent peace from being lost, then they remain ineffective in preventing virulent nationalism from eating away at sovereign states.
What makes nationalism bad? In eighteenth century Britain and France, nationalism first stood for self rule by the people. Zimmerman eloquently explains why the nationalism of the Serbs is different. Both Milosevic and Krazdic espouse the doctrine of the single nation-state, which is "deeply uncivilized" because nothing unifies such a state except nationalism. Multinational states may be home to conflict, bit they also harbor tolerance. The Serb vision of Karazdic is one of "Berlin when the wall was still standing"-- distinct regions for Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Such nationalism is uncivilized, anti-democratic, and separatist because it empowers one ethnic group over another. To avoid this imposition of nationalism, the policy of the United States was that self-determination can not be unilateral but must be pursued by dialog and peaceful means.
The United States must provide a reasonable alternative to territorial populism -- the reaffirmation of already defined political entities based on xenophobia, regionalism, and rejection of transnational economic commitments. To do this the Wilsonian principle of self-determination needs to be redefined so that self-determination is separate from a focus on territory. In other words, there is nothing wrong with self-determination, but the link between self-determination and exclusive rights to a particular area of land should be broken.
Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson address the issue of whether the conflict between a nationalist movement and the central government is a domestic or international affair. He asks if the risk to human security, humanitarian grounds, can outweigh the sovereignty of the state. Yes, if the state is ignoring "the interests of people in whose name sovereignty is exercised." It is quite clear that this is what occurs when ethnic cleansing takes place, as it has in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, as well as several regions of the Russian Federation. Carlsson goes on to advocate changing United Nation's Charter Article 2.7, which prohibits intervention in domestic issues, and recognizing the international interest that may lay inside a state's borders in some situations.
What is clear is that "the world is already unmanageable as it is," and "independent statehood for all 5,000 of the Earth's identifiable minority peoples is simply impossible. It cannot be the answer." The answer is that the United States must actively work to prevent strident nationalism from gaining the upper hand. This may mean sending troops into foreign lands to preempt armed conflict, or it may mean expending aid to countries so that they can buy the time to develop strong democratic institutions. But the right to self-determination does not have to imply a territorial grab, and it should not. The peaceful exercising of democracy can and does result in states where minorities enjoy full and equal rights and the power and legitimacy of the state is not questioned.
Here's an attempt at migrating the bibliography to html: Works Cited